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United States-Canada Air Quality
Agreement: A Framework for
Addressing Transboundary Air
Pollution Problems
Introduction
Transboundary air pollution has long plagued relations between the
United States and Canada.1 On March 13, 1991, the United States and
Canada entered into a bilateral agreement on air quality. This Note ana-
lyzes the agreement and concludes that the agreement sets up a compre-
hensive framework in which the United States and Canada can
effectively address problems of transboundary air pollution.
First, this Note describes the nature and scope of the acid rain prob-
lem between the United States and Canada. Section II surveys past
bilateral, multilateral, and domestic attempts to address this problem,
concluding that such efforts were ineffective. Section III discusses the
bilateral negotiations and difficulties the countries encountered in
reaching an agreement. Finally, this Note examines the resulting 1991
Air Quality Agreement and concludes that this agreement is indeed
"another successful chapter in the 'world's most successful bilateral
environmental relationship.' -2
I. Nature of the Transboundary Air Pollution Problem in North America
Transboundary pollution occurs when a pollution source in one country
creates a pollutant that crosses into the territory of another country,
producing adverse effects.3 Although many forms of transboundary air
1. See generally ACID RAIN AND FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS: THE POLICY DIsPUTE
BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (Jurgen Schmandt & Hilliard Roderick
eds., 1988) [hereinafter FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS].
2. Bush Says U.S.-Canada Air Quality Agreement Signifies 'Extraordinarily Strong' Rela-
tions, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 174 (1991) (quoting Canadian Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney).
3. For purposes of this Note, the term transboundary air pollution will be used
synonymously with long-range transboundary air pollution. The Economic Commis-
sion for Europe has defined long-range transboundary air pollution as "air pollution
whose physical origin is situtated wholly or in part within the area under the national
jurisdiction of one State and which has adverse effects in the area under the jurisdic-
tion of another State .. " Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10541 [hereinafter ECE Convention].
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pollution exist, the most publicized and controversial transboundary air
pollution problem is acid rain.
A. Nature of Acid Rain
Acid rain, or more accurately "acid deposition, ' 4 refers to all forms of
acid precipitation, including rain, snow, sleet, hail, fog and mist, as well
as the dry deposition of compounds that form acids when they contact
surface water. 5 Although all forms of precipitation are naturally acidic,
human activities have drastically increased precipitation acidity.6
The main chemical precursors to acid rain are sulphur oxides and
nitrogen oxides. 7 When these gases come into contact with water,
either in the atmosphere or on the earth's surface, they are spontane-
ously oxidized to form sulphuric acid and nitric acid.8 Sulphur dioxide
and nitrogen oxide result from the burning of coal, oil, and other fossil
fuels. 9 More than ninety percent of acid rain is due to man-made emis-
sions of sulphur oxides and nitrogen oxides, with sulphur oxides caus-
ing two-thirds of the problem. 10
The major sources of sulphur dioxide emissions in North America
are electric utilities." I - Natural sources account for only 5 to 25 percent
of sulphur dioxide emissions.' 2 The major sources of nitrogen oxides in
North America are electric utilities, transportation, and industry.' 3 Nat-
ural sources only account for approximately 10 percent of the total
4. SeeJAMEs L. REGENS & ROBERT W. RYCRoFr, THE ACID RAIN CONTROVERSY 35
(1988).
5. Id. at 35-36.
6. Id at 36-37. Annual rainfall in the eastern United States has been estimated
to be ten to forty times more acidic than normal due almost entirely to manmade
sources of pollutants. Michael Oppenheimer, Reducing Acid Rain in Eastern North
America: The Scientific Basis for an Acid Rain Control Policy, 19J. L. REFORM 989 (1986).
7. THE NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, NAPAP, INTERIM
ASSESSMENT: THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF ACIDIC DEPOSITION 1-4 (Executive Sum-
mary, 1987) [hereinafter NAPAP]; REGENS & RYCROFT, supra note 4, at 41-42.
8. NAPAP, supra note 7, at 1-4; REGENS & RYCROFT, supra note 4, at 42. The
transformation from sulfur dioxide to sulfate (sulfuric acid) may take from several
hours to several days. The transformation from nitrogen dioxide to nitrate (nitric
acid) is probably completed within a few hours. Id. These rates are affected by emis-
sion rate, weather, and air concentration. NAPAP, supra note 7, at 1-4.
9. Roy GOULD, GOING SOUR: SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF ACID RAIN 5-6 (1985).
10. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 61.
11. Id. at 46; GREGORY S. WETSTONE & ARMIN ROSENCRANZ, ACID RAIN IN EUROPE
AND NORTH AMERICA: NATIONAL RESPONSES TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 14
(1983). The majority of emissions in the United States come from coal-fired power
plants. GOULD, supra note 9, at 49. The remainder come chiefly from industrial,
commercial and residential combustion, transportation, smelters, and industrial
processes. Id. In Canada, metal smelters are the largest emitters of sulfur oxides. Id.
12. WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 14. Natural sources include
ocean spray, volcanic emissions, hot springs, and natural decay processes in soil. Id.
In the eastern United States, "sulfur oxide and nitrogen dioxide emissions from man-
made sources are estimated to be at least ten times greater than those from natural
sources ...." REGENS & RYCROFT, supra note 4, at 45.
13. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 46.
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nitrogen oxide emissions.1 4
Most reports indicate that there has been an historical increase in
the quantity of sulphur oxide and nitrogen oxide emissions in North
America, although some reports have qualified their findings. 15 As of
the early 1980s, the annual sulphur dioxide emissions for the United
States totalled approximately 25.7 million tons, a 26 percent increase
since 1940.16 Canada's annual sulphur dioxide emissions totalled
approximately 5.2 million tons.1 7 These increases are attributable
mainly to the demand for electricity.1 8 Nitrogen oxide emissions, while
lower than sulphur dioxide emissions, have also increased in the United
States to an estimated annual emission level of approximately 23 million
tons as of 1980.19 Canada's nitrogen oxide emissions increased to
approximately 2 million tons per year.20 The increase of nitrogen oxide
emissions in the United States and Canada is due primarily to increasing
power plant and motor vehicle emissions. 21
B. Transport of Acid Rain and Acid Rain Precursors
Acid rain recognizes no national boundaries. Both the precursors and
their acidic products may remain airborn for several days and travel
hundreds or thousands of miles before falling back to earth. 22 Tracing
environmental damages to the source of emissions is not possible with
presently available information and technology. 23 Nevertheless, current
long-range transport models support the general thesis that pollutant
emissions substantially contribute to the deposition of acid rain and its
precursors in areas far downwind. 24
With regard to transboundary movements of acid rain and its pre-
cursors between the United States and Canada, an estimated three to
four times as much sulphur dioxide moves across the border from the
United States to Canada than moves in the opposite direction. 25 Emis-
sions of sulphur dioxide from United States sources account for approx-
14. GOULD, supra note 9, at 53.
15. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 39-40.
16. CANADA/UNITED STATES AIR QUALITY AGREEMENT - PROGRESS REPORT, March
1992, at 29 [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT] (copy on file with the Cornell International
Law Journal); WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 14.
17. PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 16, at 29.
18. WETSTONE & RosENCaRNZ, supra note 11, at 14.
19. PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 16, at 30.
20. Id.
21. WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 14-15.
22. TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CO-
OPERATION OF STATES 1 (Cees Flinterman et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter TRANS-
BOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION]; WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 3. The trans-
port process is affected by many factors including weather, global wind, a pollutant's
residence time (time it remains aloft), and the height from which emissions are
released. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 42. High smokestacks magnify the
transboundary pollution problem. TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION, supra, at 1.
23. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 43.
24. WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 22.
25. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 45.
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imately one-half of Canada's sulphur-sourced acid rain. 26
C. Effects of Acid Deposition
Scientists are only beginning to understand the scope and nature of the
possible impacts of acid rain on the environment and human health.2 7
Most studies agree that acidification can degenerate, reduce, or destroy
various species populations and damage certain aquatic ecosystems. 2 8
However, the effects of acid rain on terrestrial vegetation, soils, and
human health are less certain.29 Although studies are inconclusive,
enough evidence exists to justify serious concern.3 0
Acid rain's adverse impact on aquatic ecosystems has been exten-
sively documented. 3 1 The evidence conclusively points to chemical and
biological changes in aquatic ecosystems affected by acidic inputs,3 2
resulting in the degeneration, reduction, or extinction of species, popu-
lations of fish, reptiles, crustaceans, microbiotic life, insects, and aquatic
vegetation.3 3
Knowledge of the effect of acid rain on terrestrial vegetation and
soil comes largely from laboratory experimentation, and is therefore
limited.3 4 Most studies indicate, however, that acid rain can and often
does substantially damage soil.3 5 Studies have also indicated that acid
rain may cause damage to leaves, roots, and microorganisms that form
beneficial "symbiotic relationships" 3 6 with roots.3 7 Acid rain may also
decrease a plant's resistance to other forms of stress, including pollu-
tion, climate, insects, and disease- causing microorganisms.3 8
Scientists also associate acid rain with urban damage, especially to
building stone, paint, and metals.3 9 Furthermore, acid rain has been
26. Id. at 45.
27. See generally FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 31-63; REGENS & RYCROFr,
supra note 4, at 48-58.
28. See FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 48-49.
29. See id.; REGENS & RYCROFr, supra note 4, at 48-51.
30. See generally FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 31-63; REGENS & RYCROF',
supra note 4, at 48-58.
31. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 49.
32. REGENS & RYCROFT, supra note 4, at 48.
33. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 48. Hundreds of lakes and streams in
the Adirondacks, Ontario and Nova Scotia have lost their fish. GOULD, supra note 9,
at 67.
34. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 49.
35. Id. at 49. Areas with soil low in naturally calcareous minerals (which would
neutralize the acidity) are especially vulnerable. Eastern Canada, the Southeastern
United States, New England and the North Central United States fit this description.
WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 28.
36. The term "symbiosis" refers to "[a] close, sustained living together of two
species or kinds of organisms." 14 NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 995 (15th ed.
1987).
37. GOULD, supra note 9, at 67-68.
38. Id. at 68.
39. REGENS & RYCROFr, supra note 4, at 50-51; WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra
note 11, at 36-37. It is estimated that air pollution in the United States causes from
$2 to $4 billion annually in damage to urban materials. Id. at 37.
Vol. 26
1993 United States-Canada Air Quality Agreement
linked to possible health hazards, caused indirectly through the inges-
tion of drinking water and foods affected by acid rain, and directly
through the inhalation of acid rain precursors such as sulphur oxides.40
While there is still a great degree of uncertainty concerning the
qualitative relationship between the causes and effects of acid rain and
specific source-receptor relationships, 4 t the scientific community does
agree that the acid rain problem is severe and likely to get worse.4 2
There is also agreement that human activities are the main source of the
problem. 43
I. History of United States-Canadian Efforts to Resolve Transboundary
Pollution Problems
In the context of North American pollution problems, the United States
and Canada have a long history of progresive environmental relations, 44
dating back to the early 1900s and continuing today.
A. Laying the Foundation: United States-Canadian Efforts to
Resolve Transboundary Water Pollution Problems
1. 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty and the International Joint Commission
The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty45 is primarily concerned with naviga-
tion46 and the uses and diversion 4 7 of "waters from main shore to main
shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting waterways ... along which
the international boundary between the United States and ... Canada
passes .... ,,48 The second paragraph of Article IV, however, addresses
pollution, stating that waters flowing across the boundary should not be
polluted.4 9
Significantly, the Treaty established the International Joint Com-
40. WETSTONE & RoSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 37-38. One study estimated that
150,000 deaths in 1970 were associated with sulfate pollution. Id. at 39. See also
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 16, at 52-54.
41. "[D]amage to specific areas cannot be traced to specific sources of the precur-
sor emissions." FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 45.
42. Id. at 58.
43. Id.
44. See Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, U.S.-Can., 30
U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 676 (as amended 1983) [herein-
after Water Quality Agreement]; Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty]; Convention
for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter at Trail, B.C. (U.S. v.
Can.), 49 Stat. 3245, T.S. No. 893, 3 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941) [hereinafter
Trail Smelter].
45. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 44.
46. Id. art. I.
47. Id. arts. II, III.
48. Id. preliminary art.
49. "[B]oundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be pol-
luted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other." Boundary
Waters Treaty, supra note 44, art. IV; R. James Steiner, The North American Acid Rain
Problem: Applying International Legal Principles Economically; Without Burdening Bilateral
Relations, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 3, 13 (1988).
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mission ("IJC"),5 ° a Commission still in existence today. The IJC is
comprised of six Commissioners, three from each country. 5 ' The IJC
meets at least semiannually, and is presided over by a chairman from the
country in which the meeting is held. 52 Under the Boundary Waters
Treaty, the IJC was given mandatory jurisdiction over the "use or
obstruction or diversion of the [boundary] waters."' 53 Under Articles IX,
and X of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the IJC was also given broad
authority to investigate other matters referred to it by either nation.54
Therefore, although the IJC was set up originally to monitor progress
toward achievement of the Boundary Waters Treaty objectives and to
assist in resolving disputes under the Treaty, 55 it has been called upon
to resolve or address many additional issues such as air quality, social
and economic matters, and aesthetics. 56
Under the Boundary Waters Treaty, the IJC's powers to curb
boundary water pollution are very limited. Article IV, although prohib-
iting pollution of boundary waters, is silent on the authority of the IJC to
monitor or initiate investigations into pollution generating activities.5 7
The IJC's powers over boundary water pollution are limited to those
matters referred to it under Articles IX and X.58 Even when a referral is
made under Article IX, the IJC is limited to examining and reporting on
the facts and circumstances of the particular matter.59 The IJC cannot
50. Steiner, supra note 49, at 13.
51. Water Quality Agreement, supra note 44, art. VII.
52. Timothy M. Gulden, Transfrontier Pollution and the International Joint Commission:
A Superior Means of Dispute Resolution, 17 Sw. U.L. REV. 43, 58 (1987).
53. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 44, art. VIII. IJC decisions in this area
are binding on both nations. Gulden, supra note 52, at 59, n.149.
54. Article IX states in part:
[A]ny other questions or matters of difference arising between them involv-
ing the rights, obligations, or interests of either [party) in relation to the
other or to the inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier between
the United States and the Dominion of Canada, shall be referred from time to
time to the International Joint Commission for examination and report,
whenever either [party] shall request that such questions or matters of differ-
ence be so referred.
Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 44, art. IX. Article X states in part:
Any questions or matters of difference arising between the High Contracting
Parties involving the rights, obligations, or interests of the United States or of
the Dominion of Canada either in relation to each other or to their respective
inhabitants, may be referred for decision to the International Joint Commis-
sion by the consent of the two Parties ....
Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 44, art. X. IJC reports made pursuant to articles
IX or X are not binding on either party. Id., supra note 44, arts. IX, X.
55. WETSTONE & RoSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 123.
56. Gulden, supra note 52, at 60; FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 197. See,
e.g., THIRD ANNUAL MICHIGAN-ONTARIO AIR POLLUTION ANNUAL REPORT, Docket 99 R
(1978) (IJC determined that a common international ozone standard should be
adopted where U.S. and Candian standards are inconsistent). Gulden, supra note 52,
at 60-61; WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 124.
57. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 44, art. IV; FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra
note 1, at 192-93.
58. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 192-93.
59. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 44, art. IX.
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enforce compliance with the recommendations it makes.60 Only with
respect to matters referred to it for arbitration under Article X may it
issue binding decisions. Neither country has, however, referred any
matters under Article X.6 1
2. 1972 and 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements
The United States and Canada further defined their determination to
address transboundary pollution in the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreements of 197262 and 1978.63 These agreements expanded the
jurisdiction of the IJC to include the protection of water quality in the
Great Lakes basin. Unfortunately, these Agreements did not grant the
IJC the necessary powers to adequately address transboundary air pollu-
tion problems.
The 1972 Water Quality Agreement was one of the first interna-
tional agreements to set water quality standards for boundary waters. 64
The Agreement established general and specific water quality objectives
for the Great Lakes, set a timeframe in which these objectives were to be
met, expanded the power of the IJC to implement the agreement, and
authorized the establishment of two international boards to assist the
IJC, namely the Great Lakes Water Quality Board and the Great Lakes
Science Advisory Board.6 5 The Great Lakes Water Quality Board is the
principal advisor to the IJC.6 6 The Great Lakes Science Advisory Board
provides advice on research and consists of "managers of Great Lakes
research programs and recognized experts on Great Lakes water quality
problems and related fields." 67 The 1972 Agreement served as the "ini-
tiation of a process of pollution control that required coordinated efforts
60. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 44, Art. IX; FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra
note I, at 193. See, e.g., infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
61. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 192. Experts have offered several rea-
sons for the reluctance of Canada and the United States to use this arbitration provi-
sion. First, both countries have tended to settle disputes by negotiation rather than
by arbitration through a third party. Second, the United States would have to seek
Senate approval to such arbitration. Third, both countries.have viewed the IJC's role
narrowly (to issues involving the boundary waters), not wanting to strain the IJC's
resources by expanding its tasks. Finally, arbitrations are timely and costly. Id.
62. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, U.S.-Can., 23
U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S. No. 7312.
63. Water Quality Agreement, supra note 44. The 1978 Water Quality Agree-
ment supplemented the 1972 accord, outlining with much greater specificity the
steps to be taken to achieve water quality objectives. WETSTONE & RoSENCINZ, supra
note 11, at 124. Further amendments were made to the Water Quality Agreement in
1983. Supplementary Agreement Amending the Agreement on Great Lakes Water
Quality, Oct. 16, 1983, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 10798. References made to the Water
Quality Agreement take these amendments into account.
64. WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 123.
65. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 201.
66. Water Quality Agreement, supra note 44, art. VIII(). Its members consist of
equal numbers from the United States and Canada, including representatives from
the parties and each State and Provincial Governments. Id. art. VIII(1)(a).
67. Id. art. VIII(1)(b).
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on both sides of the Great Lakes." '68
The 1978 Water Quality Agreement revised the general and specific
objectives of the 1972 Agreement, set new deadlines for meeting these
objectives, and expanded further the scope of the IJC's powers. 69 Yet
the 1978 Agreement still failed to provide the IJC with any enforcement
powers. 70
The 1978 Water Quality Agreement addressed the issue of trans-
boundary air pollution 7' but in a very limited context. The United
States and Canada agreed to develop and implement "[P]rograms to
identify pollutant sources and relative source contributions ... for those
substances which may have significant adverse effects on environmental
quality .... -72 This provision is only concerned, however, with air pol-
lution adversely affecting the Great Lakes Water Basin. 73 Thus, the
1978 Water Quality Agreement does not provide an effective means for
addressing the problems of transboundary air pollution.
B. Establishing Principles of International Environmental Law: Early
United States-Canadian Efforts to Resolve Transboundary
Air Pollution
1. The Trail Smelter Arbitration-1949
The Trail Smelter Arbitration was the first major controversy between
the United States and Canada regarding transboundary air pollution.74
This case arose from United States' allegations that sulphur dioxide
fumes from a smelter in Trail, British Columbia were causing environ-
mental damage to property in Washington State.75 Canada and the
United States initially submitted the dispute to the International Joint
Commission under Article IX of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty.7 6
The report of the IJC, recommending that the smelter company reduce
its emissions to a point where no damage would occur in the United
States, was subsequently ignored by both parties. 7 7
68. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 202.
69. Id. at 202.
70. The IJC has been highly respected, however, and its recommendations have
been very influential in both the United States and Canada. Gregory Wetstone &
Armin Rosencranz, Transbounday Air Pollution: The Search for an International Response,
8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 134 (1984) [hereinafter International Response],
71. Water Quality Agreement, supra note 44, art. VI(1)(1).
72. Id. art. VI(1)(1).
73. Erik K. Moller, Comment, The United States-Canadian Acid Rain Crisis: Proposal
for an InternationalAgreement, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1207, 1224 (1989).
74. Steiner, supra note 49, at 15.
75. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 236-37.
76. Joel A. Gallob, Transboundary Environmental Plaintiff Transboundary Pollution and
the 1979 Draft Treaty for Equal Access and Remedy, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 119-120
(1991).
77. Elizabeth Knapp, Our Neighbor's Keeper? The United States and Canada: Coping
with Transboundary Air Pollution, 9 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 159, 176-77, n.126 (1985-86).
This example illustrates the weakness of the IJC enforcement powers.
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At this point, the two countries entered into negotiations that
resulted in an executive agreement whereby Canada agreed to pay for
previous damage caused in the United States. Both parties agreed to
form an arbitration tribunal for deciding any future indemnification pay-
ments and mitigation measures.78 The arbitration tribunal applied
international principles of territorial sovereignty and external responsi-
bility to determine that Canada had a duty to prevent injuries from the
use of Canadian property and should be held liable for damage caused
in the United States.7 9 The tribunal stated:
[U]nder the principles of international law, as well as of the law of the
United States, no state has the right to use or permit the use of its terri-
tory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of a serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.80
Significantly, the tribunal imposed emission limitations on the smelter's
operations.8 1
Although the Trail Smelter principle of external responsibility has
received significant weight in the field of international law, it has failed
to curb the majority of North American transboundary air pollution
problems for two main reasons. First, the decision was binding only
because the tribunal was acting under a previously executed agreement
between Canada and the United States which gave it jurisdiction and
power over the dispute.8 2 This dispute resolution approach has not
been commmon.8 3
Second, the Trail Smelter case involved a relatively simple scenario,
in a local setting, where the link between source and damage was clear.
Canada had acknowledged the causation link between the Smelter's
emissions and the resulting property damage in the United States even
before the tribunal met. This left only the assessment of damages and
mitigation measures to be decided by the tribunal.8 4 This causation link
is typically not a serious obstacle in disputes involving short-range air
pollution problems. In cases involving the long-range transport of
transboundary air pollutants, however, modern technology is incapable
78. Trail Smelter, supra note 44; Gallob, supra note 76, at 120; Knapp, supra note
77, at 176-77, n.126.
79. Steiner, supra note 49, at 15-16; Gallob, supra note 76, at 120.
80. Trail Smelter, supra note 44, at 1965; Steiner, supra note 49, at 16; Gallob,
supra note 76, at 120.
81. Gallob, supra note 76, at 120.
82. Id. at 121. This kind of negotiation usually involves high costs-both eco-
nomic and political. Id.
83. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 192. Both governments have favored
settling such disputes by negotiation rather than by reference to a third party for
binding arbitration. Id.
84. Steiner, supra note 49, at 16. The Trail Smelter tribunal announced that a
state is obligated not to allow its air pollution to affect another state "where injury is
established by clear and convincing evidence." Trail Smelter, supra note 44, at 1965.
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of establishing with certainty the necessary causation link.8 5 Thus, the
arbitration approach taken by the United States and Canada in resolving
the Trail Smelter dispute, and the precedent set by the case, are of little
practical value in resolving issues of long-range transboundary air
pollution.8 6
2. Multilateral Agreements Addressing Transboundary Air Pollution
a. 1972 Stockholm Declaration: Development of International
Environmental Law
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm marked the beginning of a heightened consciousness of
international environmental issues worldwide. The Conference also
stimulated the development of international environmental law.8 7 The
Conference adopted a U.N. Declaration on the Human Environment, to
which both the United States and Canada are signatories, that elaborates
on a State's external responsibility to protect the environment.8 8 Princi-
ple 21 provides that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environ-
ment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.89
The 1972 Declaration is an important component in the develop-
ment of international environmental law.90 The 1972 Declaration and
other accepted principles of international law, however, have not effec-
85. Steiner, supra note 49, at 17; International Response, supra note 70, at 123. The
acid rain problem involves the transport of pollution emissions from hundreds of
polluters over thousands of miles of boundary. Steiner, supra note 49, at 17.
86. See Gallob, supra note 76, at 121; International Response, supra note 70, at 123.
87. JuTrA BRUNNEE, ACID RAIN AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND REGULATION 81 (1988); International Response, supra note 70, at 92. Some
credit this conference with being the first to thrust the concern for acid rain onto the
world stage. J. Regens & R. Rycroft, Options for Financing Acid Rain Controls, 26 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 519 (1986).
88. Steiner, supra note 49, at 21.
89. Report of the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.48/14 (1972) (Principle 21), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1421 (1972)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1972 U.N. Declaration]. Principle 21 recognizes the
competing principles of absolute territorial sovereignty; the right of a sovereign state
to exploit its own resources without interference from foreign states; and external
responsibility- the obligation of a state to consider the extraterritorial impacts of its
internal actions on other States. Susan C. Cagann, Comment, Finding a Common
Ground for Canada and the United States to Resolve Acid Rain Disputes, 1988J. Disp. RESOL.
175, 179 (1988); See generally Anthony Scott, The Canadian-American Problem of Acid
Rain, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 337 (1986).
90. BRUNEE, supra note 87, at 84. Additional authority for the principal of exter-
nal responsibility may be found in the holding of the International Court ofJustice in
the 1949 Corfu Channel case. Corfu Channel Case, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF POL-
LUTION 75-77 (J. Barros & D.Johnston eds., 1974). The court held that Albania had
an obligation to warn ships in territorial waters that those waters contained
minefields and declared that it is "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its
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tively curbed long-range transboundary air pollution for four major
reasons.
9 1
First, such general statements concerning the duty of states towards
other states do not provide adequate guidance to nations as to what type
of conduct is unacceptable. 9 2 Present international legal doctrines are
not easily applied to specific controversies.9 3
Second, even if these principles were sufficiently clear to provide
meaningful guidance, no effective enforcement mechanism exists. 94 An
international agency can only give force to those international environ-
mental principles that are directly incorporated into binding agree-
ments95 or are accepted as customary international law.9 6 Even the
most respected international adjudicatory body, the International Court
of Justice, may rule on a case only after the involved nations have con-
sented to a reference.9 7
Third, these general principles of international environmental law
do not adequately foster preventive actions, despite their marginal
deterrent value.9 8 Disputes to which such principles would apply typi-
cally arise only after the environmental damage has occurred.9 9
Finally, these international doctrines do not solve the proof of cau-
sation problem associated with air pollution injuries. This problem of
proof remains a major obstacle given the technological difficulty in trac-
ing point source air pollution emissions to environmental damages cou-
pled with the demanding causation requirement that courts have
imposed on plaintiffs claiming environmental injuries. 0 0
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States." Id. at 76; see also
Trail Smelter, supra note 44.
For a discussion of whether Principal 21 may form the basis of customary interna-
tional law, see Steiner, supra note 49, at 22 (citing the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b) (in addition to treaties and general principles of law
accepted by civilized nations, customary international law is a principle underlying
the imposition of international law on parties)). See also John Ntambirweki, The Devel-
oping Countries in the Evolution of an International Environmental Law, 14 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 905, 909 (1991) (the norms Principal 21 prescribes may form the
basis of customary rules of international law).
91. See International Response, supra note 70, at 122-23.
92. Id. at 122.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The 1972 Declaration is not a binding agreement. Id.
96. Statute of the International Court ofJustice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1031, T.S.
No. 993.
97. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 96, arts. 36, 37; see
International Response, supra note 70, at 122-23.
98. International Response, supra note 70, at 123.
99. Id.
100. Id.; see supra notes 23, 89 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in
tracing environmental damages to point sources of emissions); see also supra notes 83,
84 and accompanying text (the Trail Smelter tribunal suggested a clear and convinc-
ing standard for proving the causation link between emissions and damage).
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b. Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution
On November 13, 1979, thirty-one industrial nations, including Canada
and the United States, became parties to the Economic Commission for
Europe ("ECE")' 0 ' Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution.' 0 2 Under the ECE Convention, the parties agree to develop
"policies and strategies" to combat the discharge of air pollutants, 10 3
focusing on those pollutants that cause damage outside of a state's
boundaries.10 4 The Convention establishes a framework for interna-
tional cooperation in monitoring and research activities, and in assem-
bling and disseminating information on national emissions, pollution
control, and energy policies.' 0 5 The Convention also imposes "notice
and consultation" requirements on national policy changes likely to
have a "significant risk of long-range transboundary air pollution"
affecting citizens of other states. 10 6
Although an improvement over past agreements addressing the
problem of long-range transboundary air pollution, the ECE Conven-
tion inadequately addressed the transboundary air pollution problem
between the United States and Canada for three main reasons. 10 7 First,
the ECE Convention imposes only limited obligations which are stated
in general terms. Article 2 provides:
The Contracting Parties, taking due account of the facts and problems
involved, are determined to protect man and his environment against air
pollution and shall endeavour to limit and, as far as possible, gradually
reduce and prevent air pollution including long-range transboundary air
pollution. 10 8
The clauses "taking due account of the facts and problems
involved," "shall endeavor to limit," and "as far as possible, gradually
reduce and prevent air pollution" reflect an effort to limit obligations
and to preserve discretion. 10 9 Additionally, the ECE Convention pro-
vides that in developing policies regarding air quality management, the
nations are to consider the cost and effectiveness of existing remedies,
101. Members of the ECE include not only the Western and Eastern European
countries, but also Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Gallob,
supra note 76, at 123.
102. ECE Convention, supra note 3. The ECE Convention was ratified and entered
into force in 1983. Steiner, supra note 49, at 23. For a comprehensive discussion of
the ECE Convention, see Lothar Giindling, Multilateral Co-operation of States Under the
ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, in TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POL-
LUTION, supra note 22, at 19-61.
103. In article 3 of the ECE Convention, "[t]he Contracting Parties [agreed to]
develop without undue delay policies and strategies which shall serve as a means of
combating the discharge of air pollutants .. " ECE Convention, supra note 3.
104. Steiner, supra note 49, at 22.
105. ECE Convention, supra note 3, arts. 7, 8, and 9.
106. ECE Convention, supra note 3, arts. 5, 8.
107. Gallob, supra note 76, at 126.
108. ECE Convention, supra note 3, art. 2.
109. Gfindling, supra note 102, at 22.
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accommodate the need for "balanced development," and use control
technology that is "economically feasible."110 The ECE Convention
imposes obligations, therefore, in general terms with ample room for
avoidance.
Second, the obligations to inform and consult are also stated very
reluctantly. The duty to consult, outlined in Article 5, is provided only
as a "fundamental principle." Article 5 requires only that the parties
consult, upon request, if one of the parties is actually affected or
exposed to a "significant risk of long-range transboundary air pollution
.... ," I I The right to request consultation is linked to difficult ques-
tions, such as: What is a "significant risk"? How is a "significant risk" to
be determined, and to what extent must a nation investigate such risks?
The ECE Convention, in order to provide a means for answering
these questions, imposes a duty to exchange information on "policies,
scientific activities and technical measures" aimed at combatting air pol-
lution.11 2 This duty, however, is limited to those policies or activities
"which may have adverse effects, thereby contributing to the reduction
of air pollution including long-range transboundary air pollution."' " 3
Article 8 imposes a duty to exchange information on "major changes in
national policies and in general industrial development, and their poten-
tial impact, which would be likely to cause significant changes in long-
range transboundary air pollution."' 1 4 This does not solve the prob-
lem, however, as it still requires an initial determination of whether a
policy or action "would be likely to cause significant changes in long-
range transboundary air pollution." 15
Third, the ECE Convention lacks any effective enforcement mecha-
nism. The ECE Convention provides merely that "[i]f a dispute arises
between two or more Contracting Parties to the present Convention as
to the interpretation or application of the Convention, they shall seek a
solution by negotiation or by any other method of dispute settlement
acceptable to the parties to the dispute."' "16 This dispute resolution
clause does not impose any substantive obligations on the parties and
rarely have nations been willing to consent to international adjudica-
110. ECE Convention, supra note 3, art. 6 provides:
Taking into account Articles 2 to 5, the ongoing research exchange of infor-
mation and monitoring and the results thereof, the cost and effectiveness of
local and other remedies and, in order to combat air pollution, in particular
that originating from new or rebuilt installations, each Contracting Party
undertakes to develop the best policies and strategies including air quality
management systems and, as part of them, control measures compatible with
balanced development, in particular by using the best available technology
which is economically feasible and low and non-waste technology.
111. Id. art. 5.
112. Id. art. 4.
113. Id.
114. Id. art. 8(b).
115. Id.
116. Id. art. 13.
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tions before the International Court of Justice. 17
Three protocols were added to the ECE Convention in 1984, 1985,
and 1988, which imposed more specific obligations." 8 Unfortunately,
these measures have also proved ineffective in significantly curbing
transboundary air pollution between the United States and Canada.
The 1984 Protocol, adopted by both Canada and the United States,
encourages the financing of cooperative projects to monitor and evalu-
ate the long-range transport of air pollutants in Europe. 19 Obviously,
financing such projects is a step in the right direction, but it does not
solve any of the problems discussed above.
The 1985 Protocol' 20 calls for a 30 percent reduction in sulphur
emissions by each signatory.' 2 1 It also attempts to standardize emission
calculations. 122 Although Canada is a party to this Protocol, the United
States is not. The provisions, therefore, cannot be applied against the
United States.
The 1988 Protocol, 123 signed by both Canada and the United
States, requires signatories to freeze their nitrous oxide emissions by
December 31, 1994 at such levels as to not exceed "their national
annual emissions of nitrogen oxides or their transboundary fluxes ... of
such emissions for the calendar year 1987 or any previous year."' 24
The phrase "or any previous year," weakening the obligations of the
Protocol, was added at the request of the United States which wanted to
count pre-1987 reductions towards the reduction goal. 12 5
The ECE Convention and its Protocols provide a general frame-
work in which countries are able to coordinate their efforts in curbing
transboundary air pollution. But the Protocols contain no enforcement
mechanisms or dispute resolution provisions. For these reasons, the
117. International Response, supra note 70, at 122-23.
118. Gallob, supra note 76, at 124.
119. Protocol... On Long Term Financing of the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring
and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe, U.N. Doc. ECE/
EB.AIR/I 1, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 701 (1988).
120. 1985 Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by
at Least 30 Per Cent, U.N. Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/12, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 707 (1988)
[hereinafter 1985 Protocol].
121. "The Parties shall reduce their national annual sulphur emissions or their
transboundary fluxes by at least 30 percent as soon as possible and at the latest by
1993, using 1980 levels as the basis for calculation of reductions." Id. art. 2.
122. Moller, supra note 73, at 1223, n.92.
123. 1988 Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Trans-
boundary Fluxes, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 214 (1989) (this protocol came into effect on
Feb. 14, 1991) [hereinafter 1988 Protocol].
124. Id. art. 2. The 1988 Protocol initially required actual reductions, rather than a
freeze tied to a particular year, but due to United States opposition to such stringent
measures, the current approach was adopted. Gallob, supra note 76, at 124-25.
125. The 1988 Protocol also required that the signatories commence talks on fur-
ther reductions. 1988 Protocol, supra note 123, art. 2; Gallob, supra note 76, at 124.
While approximately half of the signatories have committed to reduce nitrous oxide
emissions to a greater extent than called for by the 1988 Protocol, many others have
been reluctant to implement the 1988 Protocol due to the political problems associ-
ated with regulating automobiles, the primary source of nitrous oxides. Id. at 125.
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ECE Convention has done little to combat the problems of long-range
transboundary air pollution and acid rain.1 2 6
3. Domestic Efforts to Resolve the Acid Rain Problem
Both the United States and Canada have a history of legislation directed
at controlling air pollution. These attempts, however, focused on local
problems and failed to adequately control the problem of transboundary
air pollution. 12 7
a. United States Domestic Clean Air Act
Early versions of the United States Clean Air Act 12 8 reflected the mis-
conceptions many policymakers shared about the nature of air pollution.
The 1950s solution to air pollution, building taller smokestacks, was
designed to address air quality problems associated with high pollutant
concentrations near the pollution source, and gave no consideration to
long-range air pollution problems. 12 9
In 1970, Congress attempted to remedy the problem of long-range
air pollution which was exacerbated by its tall smokestack policy. 130
The 1970 amendment' 3' to the Clean Air Act placed sulphur dioxide
and nitrogen dioxide on the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") list of hazardous pollution and set national ambient air quality
standards to limit the emission of these pollutants.' 3 2 This attempt to
control long-range air pollution failed, however, because the standards
limited only concentrations of local air pollution, not air pollution that
travelled long distances.' 33
The EPA Administrator finally issued regulations in 1982 to imple-
ment section 123 of the Act. However, these regulations do not apply to
most sources with tall stacks because the Administrator leniently inter-
126. Gallob, supra note 76, at 124-26. "Judging by the modest effects of the 1979
... Convention and its protocols, voluntary self-restraint is insufficient to address the
problem." Id. at 126.
127. Moller, supra note 73, at 1214-15; Gallob, supra note 76, at 134.
128. The Clean Air Act as now in force is at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988),
amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). The Clean Air Act was origi-
nally enacted in 1963. Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
It was significantly amended in 1967, 1970, 1977 and 1990, with minor changes
occuring more recently. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485
(1967); 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970);
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 385 (1977); 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
129. Steiner, supra note 49, at 18.
130. Id. at 18.
131. 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, supra note 128.
132. Steiner, supra note 49, at 18-19; 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, supra note
128, at 1676, 1678, 1679. National ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) are maxi-
mum permissible concentrations of certain air pollutants established by the EPA and
implemented through pollution control requirements devised by the states. WET-
STONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 97.
133. Steiner, supra note 49, at 19. Taller smokestacks resulted. Id.
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preted the phrase "good engineering practice."' 1 4 The regulations
allowed emitters to add pollution control mechanisms to bring their
emissions within the levels that adjusting the stack height would have
accomplished.1 3 5 The regulations only aggravated the problem.
Congress also amended section 115136 in 1977.13 7 Section 115, as
amended, authorizes the EPA Administrator to require states to revise
their air quality implementation plans to eliminate emissions that "cause
or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country." 15 8
The United States government must follow three steps before
imposing section 115 control requirements.' 3 9 First, the Administrator
must find that emissions in the United States endanger public health or
welfare in a foreign country. 140 Second, the Administrator must deter-
mine that the foreign country gives the United States reciprocal rights
with respect to the control of international air pollution.1 4 ' Third, if
such findings are made, the Administrator must formally notify the
state(s) in which the emissions originate.' 4 2 The states notified must
revise their implementation plans as needed to "prevent or eliminate
the endangerment" to the foreign country. 14 3
Section 115 has proven to be of limited effectiveness in addressing
the transboundary air pollution problem.' 4 4 Two D.C. Circuit decisions
illustrate this point. Thomas v. New York' 4 5 stemmed from conclusions of
134. Steiner, supra note 49, at 20; WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 101.
135. Steiner, supra note 49, at 20. Pollution emitters have used computer models
to justify maintaining their current stack height. Id. at 20.
136. 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 115, 91 Stat. 685, 710
(current version at 42 U.S.C. 7415 (1988)).
137. Id; see generally Stuart N. Keith, The EPA's Discretion to Regulate Acid Rain: A
Discussion of the Requirements for Triggering Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, 36 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 133 (1988); Bennett A. Caplan, Note, The Applicability of the Clean Air Act Section
115 to Canada's Transboundary Acid Precipitation Problem, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
539 (1984); The Transnational Implications of Acid Rain, 5 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 2 (1981). Sec-
tion 115 had previously dealt with both interstate and international air pollution.
138. § 115, 91 Stat. at 685-710; International Response, supra note 70, at 127.
139. § 115, 91 Stat. at 685-710.
140. § 115, 91 Stat. at 685-7 10. Previously, to trigger this section, the Administra-
tor had to determine that pollution originating in the United States endangered "the
health or welfare of persons in a foreign country .. " Act of Oct. 20, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992, 995; John L. Sullivan, Beyond the Bargaining Table: Canada's
Use of Section 115 of the United States Clean Air Act to Prevent Acid Rain, 16 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 193, 209 (1983). The 1977 amendment omitted the word "person," and incor-
porated the phrase "public health or welfare" to include effects on the natural and
man-made environment, as well as effects on persons. Id.
141. § 115, 91 Stat. at 685-710; International Response, supra note 70, at 128. See
generally Sullivan, supra note 140 (discussing section 115's legislative history in defin-
ing reciprocity). Most commentators agree that Canada has satisfied the reciprocity
requirement. See generally id.; see also Moller, supra note 73, at 1217.
142. § 115, 91 Stat. at 685-710; International Response, supra note 70, at 128.
143. § 115(b), 91 Stat. at 685-710.
144. See Moller, supra note 73, at 1217-19; International Response, supra note 70, at
128.
145. Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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the EPA Administrator, Douglas Costle, in 1981, that United States
sources were contributing to "atmospheric overloadings over some sen-
sitive areas of Canada," that transboundary acid deposits were causing
harm to both Canada and the United States, and that "[s]ection 115
authority could appropriately be used to develop solutions." 14 6 The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the endangerment and reciproc-
ity findings pursuant to section 115 must be made in accordance with
the notice and public comment requirements of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. 14 7 Because Costle had not followed these procedures, the
court held the findings invalid. 148 As one commentator has stated, "[a]t
a minimum .... [this] decision will require that future attempts to invoke
section 115 involve an often time-consuming rulemaking
procedure."14 9
In Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 150 the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected an argument that the EPA acted arbitrarily by
denying the requests of Ontario and the state of New York that the EPA
make endangerment and reciprocity findings under section 115.151 The
court concluded, based on the statute; that unless the EPA was prepared
to identify specific sources in specific states as contributors to air pollu-
tion endangering public health or welfare in Canada, and to call for
additional controls on those sources, there would be no point in issuing
the endangerment and reciprocity findings.1 5 2 The court also rejected
an argument that the EPA had unreasonably delayed those findings.
The court stated that any delay was reasonable given the permissibility
of the EPA's "unitary proceeding" interpretation and the complexity of
the scientific and technical questions involved.
153
These two decisions substantially limit the utility of section 115 by
requiring costly and time-consuming proceedings and by restricting
attempts to initiate such proceedings.' 54 The problems are magnified
146. Gallob, supra note 76, at 128 (quoting letter from Douglas Costle, EPA
Administrator to Senator George Mitchell (Jan. 13, 1981), reprinted in WETSTONE &
RosENCRANZ, supra note 11).
147. Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1446; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553
(1988).
148. Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1447.
149. Gallob, supra note 76, at 130.
150. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
151. Ontario, 912 F.2d at 1535. The EPA denied the requests because it inter-
preted section 115 as requiring a "unitary proceeding," rather than a bifurcated pro-
ceeding. The endangerment and reciprocity findings would be made in one
proceeding and the issuance of formal notices to the states to mandate implementa-
tion revisions in a separate proceeding. Id. at 1534. Ontario had not requested, at
this point, that the administrator issue notices to any states.
152. Id. at 1534-35.
153. Id.
154. See Gallob, supra note 76, at 130. "[I]t is doubtful that section 115 of the
Clean Air Act will be useful in lowering the United States' transboundary air pollu-
tion contribution." Moller, supra note 73, at 1219. See generally Sullivan, supra note
140.
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by the scientific uncertainty surrounding transboundary air pollution.
Such uncertainties can be used to justify the Administrator's decision
not to initiate section 115 proceedings. In addition, by giving the
Administrator little guidance and wide discretion, Congress has left the
process of invoking section 115 open to political pressure.155
b. Canadian Clean Air Act
Canadian air pollution laws are comparable to the United States Clean
Air Act controls, involving elements of federal and provincial control.156
In Canada, however, the federal role is primarily one of guidance and
the provinces remain relatively autonomous.' 5 7
Section 21.1 of the Canadian Clean Air Act 158 is very similar to sec-
tion 115 of the United States Clean Air Act with respect to international
pollution.' 59 Under section 21.1(1), if the Environmental Minister
determines that "an air contaminant emitted ... in Canada creates or
contributes to the creation of air pollution that may reasonably be
expected to constitute a significant danger to the health, safety or wel-
fare of persons in any other country," he shall "recommend to the [cabi-
net] . . . such specific emission standards . . . as he may consider
appropriate for the elimination or significant reduction of that dan-
ger.' 60 Except with regard to federal sources, the Minister is not
authorized to make such a recommendation without first determining
that provincial action cannot adequately address the problem. 16 If the
province can mitigate the problem, the Minister must attempt to secure
such action. 162 If the cabinet feels that the Minister has made a "reason-
able but unsuccessful endeavor" to secure provincial action, and that the
other country provides reciprocal rights, it is in turn authorized to pre-
scribe specific emission standards.' 63
155. International Response, supra note 70, at 132.
156. Moller, supra note 73, at 1217; Sullivan, supra note 140, at 213.
157. Sullivan, supra note 140, at 213.
158. R.S.C. ch. C-32 (1985) (the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, pro-
claimed as law by the Canadian Parliament on June 30, 1988, consolidates within a
single instrument a number of pieces of legislation including the Canadian Clean Air
Act).
159. Sullivan, supra note 140, at 217-218; International Response, supra note 70, at
130. The legislative history of the 1980 amendments to section 21.1 indicates that
the purpose of the amendments was to ensure reciprocity with section 115 of the
United States Clean Air Act. Sullivan, supra note 140, at 219; International Response,
supra note 70, at 130, n.247.
160. An Act to Amend the Clean Air Act, ch. 45, 1980 C. Gaz. 1159, 1160 (Part III)
(§ 2 1.1(1)). Sullivan, supra note 140, at 218. "[H]ealth, safety or welfare of persons"
is not defined in the Canadian Clean Air Act, although the legislative history of the
1980 amendments indicates that this phrase includes affects on the environment. See
id. at 219.
161. 1980 C. Gaz. at 1161 (§ 21.1(3)(a)-(d)).
162. Id. at 1162 (§ 21.2(2)).
163. Id. at 1162 (§ 21.2(1)); Sullivan, supra note 140, at 218-19. The foreign coun-
try must provide "by law for essentially the same kind of benefits in favor of Canada
with respect to abatement or control of air pollution as is provided in favour of that
country by virtue of this Act." 1980 C. Gaz. 1160 (§ 21.2(1)).
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The implementation of section 21.1 of the Canadian Clean Air Act
has been of less pressing concern than the enactment of section 115 of
the United States Clean Air Act. 6 4 Canada contributes proportionally
less to the overall air pollution problems in the United States than the
United States contributes to air pollution problems in Canada.1 65 Not
surprisingly, Canada has been historically more eager to establish pro-
grams addressing transboundary air pollution than has the United
States.' 6 6 Therefore, the main significance of section 21.1 is in satisfy-
ing the reciprocity requirement of section 115 of the United States
Clean Air Act.' 6 7
I. Working Towards a Bilateral Agreement on Transboundary Air
Pollution
A. Beginning Negotiations
Transboundary air pollution first became the subject of negotiation
between the United States and Canadian governments in 1978,
prompted by an International Joint Commission' 68 study showing that a
high proportion of pollutants entering the Great Lakes came from the
atmosphere.169 The talks were also triggered by a Canadian proposal to
construct two new oil-fired thermal generating plants across the border
from Montana and Minnesota. 170 In October 1978, the two countries
established the Bilateral Research Consultation Group on Long-Range
Transport of Air Pollutants. 17 1
On June 20, 1979, based on this group's first report showing that
large areas of North America were sensitive to acidic deposition, Canada
and the United States issued a Joint Statement on Transboundary Air
Quality172 in which both countries committed to reduce certain types of
transboundary air pollution identified as injurious to health, ecosystems
and property.' 73 In the Joint Statement, the parties reiterated their
164. International Response, supra note 70, at 131.
165. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
166. WETSTONE & RoSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 114-15.
167. See supra note 141 and accompanying text; see also International Response, supra
note 70, at 131.
168. See supra notes 50-61, 71-73 and accompanying text.
169. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 65.
170. Id.
171. Id.; Steiner, supra note 49, at 27; WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at
124.
172. Joint Statement on Transboundary Air Quality by the Government of Canada
and the Government of the United States of America, July 26, 1979, reprinted in
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., FINAL REPORT-LONG
RANGE AIR POLLUTION ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: RECOURSES IN LAW AND POL-
icy-A U.S.-CANADA CASE STUDY, app. I (1982) [hereinafter Joint Statement]; Wr-
STONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 124.
173. TheJoint Statement listed the principles to be addressed in formulation of an
agreement on transboundary air quality:
prevention and reduction of transboundary air pollution which results in del-
eterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living
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adherence to the principles of international environmental responsibil-
ity established in the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty 174 and Principle 21
of the 1972 United Nations Declaration.' 75
B. 1980 Memorandum of Intent
On August 5, 1980, the United States and Canada signed a more formal
and specific "Memorandum of Intent Concerning Transboundary Air
Pollution."' 17 6 This document is significant for three main reasons.
First, in this Memorandum of Intent, the parties made a commitment to
develop a bilateral agreement concerning transboundary air pollution as
soon as possible. 177 Second, the parties agreed "to take interim actions
available under current authority to combat transboundary air pollu-
tion."1 78 Third, the parties established a joint coordinating committee
to begin negotiations on the bilateral agreement no later than June 1,
1981.179
C. U.S. Policy of Research Before Action: Stalemate
For over a decade following the signing of the Memorandum of Intent in
1980, the countries failed to achieve significant progress in negotiating a
bilateral agreement.18 0 When the Reagan Administration took office in
1981, it gave environmental concerns a much lower priority than the
resources and ecosystems, and impair or interfere with amenities and other
legitimate uses of the environment; and expanded notification and consulta-
tion on matters involving a risk or potential risk of transboundary air pollu-
tion.
Joint Statement, supra note 172; WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 125.
174. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 44.
175. 1972 U.N. Declaration, supra note 89; see FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1,
at 66.
176. Memorandum of Intent Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5,
1980, U.S.-Can., 20 I.L.M. 690 [hereinafter Memorandum of Intent].
177. Memorandum of Intent, supra note 176; FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at
66; WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 125. The parties agreed specifically
"to develop a bilateral agreement which will reflect and further the development of
effective domestic control programs and other measures to combat transboundary air
pollution ... [and] to facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement as soon as possi-
ble." Memorandum of Intent, supra note 176, at 691.
178. Memorandum of Intent, supra note 176; FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at
66; WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 125. Both countries agreed specifi-
cally to:
(a) develop domestic air pollution control policies and strategies, and as nec-
essary and appropriate, seek legislative or other support to give effect to
them; (b) promote vigorous enforcement of existing laws and regulations as
they require limitation of emissions from new, substantially modified and
existing facilities in a way which is responsive to the problems of trans-
boundary air pollution.
Memorandum of Intent, supra note 176, at 691-92.
179. Memorandum of Intent, supra note 176, at 691; FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra
note 1, at 66.
180. Moller, supra note 73, at 1211; Fitzhugh Green, Acid Rain and U.S.-Canadian
Relations, 9 WASH. Q. 103 (1986).
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Carter Administration.18 1 The Reagan Administration felt that the sci-
entific evidence concerning acid rain was inconclusive, asserting that
further research was necessary prior to implementing any comprehen-
sive and expensive control programs.18 2 The U.S. EPA even went so far
as to allow increases in emission levels, reflecting "a generally unrecep-
tive U.S. attitude toward the development of a cooperative solution to
bilateral pollution problems."183
Other major factors underlying the Reagan Administration's reluc-
tance to act involved the extent of emissions that would be affected by
any abatement programs and the costs associated with such pro-
grams.' 8 4 Abatement programs in the United States would cost more
than similar programs in Canada, due primarily to the disproportionate
level of transboundary air pollution originating within the United
States,' 8 5 and also to the higher costs associated with controlling emis-
sions from the dominant polluting industries in the United States as
compared to those in Canada.18 6 Furthermore, the politics of acid rain
in the United States are more complex than in Canada. 18 7 The separa-
tion of powers, the power of special interest groups, and the regional
interests contribute to the complexity. 188
Although the Reagan Administration continued to adhere to its
strategy of "research before action,"' 8 9 and Congress rejected propos-
als for more stringent domestic legislation, 190 Canada went forward
with its own legislation. In 1984, Canada implemented control strate-
gies aimed at reducing sulphur dioxide emissions in its seven eastern-
most provinces by 50 percent of 1980 levels by 1994.191 A year later,
181. Moiler, supra note 73, at 1213. Negotiations with the Canadian government
in the late 1970s was part of the Carter Administration's extensive environmental
program. Id.
182. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 67; MARSHALL E. WILCHER, THE POLI-
TICS OF ACID RAIN: POLICY IN CANADA, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 62
(1989). This position was maintained despite the call for immediate action by a panel
of scientists supported by the White House. Id. at 62.
183. WETSTONE & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 11, at 125-26.
184. Moller, supra note 73, at 1212.
185. Id. The United States has been estimated to produce approximately 10 times
as much nitrogen oxide as Canada and approximately 5.5 times as much sulfur diox-
ide. Id. at 1212 (citing SUBCOMMrITEE ON ACID RAIN OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON
FISHERIES AND FORESTRY, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., STILL WATER: REPORT OF THE SUB-
COMMITTEE 35-36 (1981)). It has also been estimated that three to four times as
much sulphur dioxide moves across the border from the United States to Canada
than moves in the opposite direction. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
186. Moller, supra note 73, at 1212. The costs of cleaning pollutants from metal
smelters, Canada's largest polluting industry, are much less than the costs of cleaning
coal-fired power facilities, the largest source of pollution in the United States. Id.
187. WILCHER, supra note 182, at 61.
188. Id. The Reagan Administration had some very influential supporters in Con-
gress for its "caution before action" position. Id. at 63.
189. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 69.
190. See WILCHER, supra note 182, at 64-65.
191. REGENS & RYCROFT, supra note 4, at 150. The United States rejected Cana-
dian proposals for an agreement calling for similar reductions in the United States.
FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 68.
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Canada announced measures to toughen automobile emission
standards. 19 2
D. Special Envoys on Acid Rain
In 1985, President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney finally agreed
on cooperative action and appointed two special envoys to review the
problem of acid rain. 193 A year later the special envoys concluded that
acid rain was indeed a serious transboundary problem, 19 4 and called for
a $5 billion commitment from the United States to develop new clean
coal technologies to abate acid rain.' 95 Although Reagan requested the
$5 billion from Congress, the Canadians asserted that the request alone
was insufficient to implement the terms of the envoys' report. 19 6
The Reagan administration continued to drag its feet. Not until the
Bush Administration took over in 1989 were substantive domestic con-
trols implemented and the foundation laid for a bilateral agreement.
E. 1990 Amendments to the United States Clean Air Act: Providing
the Foundation for a Bilateral Agreement
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 197 provided the foundation for a
bilateral agreement with Canada on long-range transboundary air pollu-
tion. Title IV of the 1990 amendments adds a complex new program to
reduce acid deposition that applies to coal-fired electric utilities. 198 The
program is intended to limit sulphur dioxide emissions from utilities to
8.9 million tons annually by the year 2000,199 a reduction of ten million
tons from the 1980 level. 200 The program is based on a system of
sulphur dioxide emissions allowances that utilities can bank or sell to
192. REGENS & RYCROFr, supra note 4, at 150. Canada also signed the 1985 Proto-
col to Reduce Sulfur Dioxide Emissions, which the United States refused to sign. Id.
at 151.
193. The appointees were Drew Lewis, former Secretary of Transportation, and
William Davis, former Premier of Ontario. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 70.
194. DREW LEwIs & WILLIAM DAvIS,JoINT REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ENVOYS ON ACID
RAIN 6 (1986). See FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 70-72.
195. REGENS & RYCROFr, supra note 4, at 152; FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1,
at 71.
196. FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 71-72.
197. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. Can-
ada was a major actor in lobbying for the acid rain controls established in these
amendments. WILCHER, supra note 182, at 70.
198. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, Title IV, §§ 401-416,
104 Stat. 2584-2634. Coal-fired electric utilities are the major source of sulfur diox-
ide emissions in the United States, and the largest contributor to the acid rain prob-
lem. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
199. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 10 1-549, § 403, 104 Stat. 2589
(42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (Supp. 11 1990)).
200. Id. § 401(b), 104 Stat. 2584 (42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (Supp. I 1990)). The emis-
sion reductions will be implemented in two phases. Phase I commences on January
1, 1995 and imposes controls on the 110 highest emitting utility plants. Phase II,
which begins in the year 2000, extends the acid rain program to virtually all remain-
ing plants and new plants, with the goal of achieving a permanent national cap of
8.95 million tons of sulphur dioxide emissions annually for electric utilities. Id.
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other emitters in an emissions trading program. 20 1 Theoretically, this
system will increase the efficiency of pollution abatement by encourag-
ing those polluters who can abate emissions most cheaply to do so, while
at the same time holding total pollution at a given level. 20 2
The 1990 amendments also proposed to reduce nitrogen oxide
emission levels by 2 million tons from the 1980 level.20 3 The amend-
ments establish standards 60 percent lower than previous standards for
gasoline-powered automobiles, 204 and authorize the EPA Administrator
to establish standards twice as stringent if they are found to be neces-
sary, technologically feasible, and cost-effective. 20 5 They also establish
clean fuel and clean-fueled vehicle programs, including a pilot program
in California which requires the production of significant numbers of
clean-fueled vehicles by 1999206 and a similar program for fleet vehicles
in the most heavily polluted areas.20 7
While these amendments fall short of the recommendations made
by many groups, they are a vast improvement over previous domestic
efforts to address the problem. 208 More significantly, they officially rec-
ognize that acid rain "represents a threat to natural resources, ecosys-
tems, materials, visibility, and public health," that it is a problem of
"international significance," that reductions in sulphur dioxide and
nitrogen dioxide emissions would curb acid rain, that technology is cur-
rently available to control these emissions, and that delaying such reme-
dies would adversely affect current and future generations. 209 By
recognizing the intricate problems of acid rain, these amendments
201. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 403, 104 Stat. 2589
(42 U.S.C. § 7651(b)). An "allowance" is an "authorization, allocated to an affected
unit by the Administrator [of the EPA] ... to emit, during or after a specified calen-
dar year, one ton of sulfur dioxide." Id. § 402, 104 Stat. 2585 (42 U.S.C. § 7651(a)).
202. Gallob, supra note 76, at 134. A polluter with cheap abatement costs may, for
example, clean up beyond the Act's requirements and recover these costs and possi-
bly make a profit by selling these unused allowances. Presumably, a polluter that
faces abatement costs that are higher than the cost of these allowances will be the
buyer of these excess allowances. Thus, the pollution emission level will be capped
and the abatement will be achieved by those polluters that can do so most cheaply.
203. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2584
(42 U.S.C. § 7651).
204. The nitrogen oxide standard was lowered from 1.0 to 0.4 grams per vehicle
mile. Id. § 202(g)(1), 104 Stat. 2474 (42 U.S.C. § 7 52 1(g)(1); Gallob, supra note 76,
at 134. This standard was to be met by 40 percent of the vehicles by the 1994 model
year, 80 percent by 1995 and 100 percent by 1996. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,
Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 202(g)(1), 104 Stat. 2474 (42 U.S.C. § 7521(g)(1)).
205. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 202(i), 104 Stat.
2476 (42 U.S.C. § 7521(i)).
206. Id. § 249, 104 Stat. 2525 (42 U.S.C. § 7589).
207. Id. § 246,104 Stat. 2520 (42 U.S.C. § 7586).
208. The National Academy of Sciences recommended twelve million ton sulphur
dioxide and four million ton nitrogen oxide reductions. Clean Air Act Amendments of
1989: Hearings on H.R. 3030 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 470 (1989) (statement
by the American Planning Association).
209. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2584
(42 U.S.C. § 7651).
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became the foundation for a bilateral agreement with Canada on trans-
boundary air pollution.
IV. 1991 Canada-United States Agreement on Air Quality
On March 13, 1991, President Bush and Prime Minister Mulroney
signed the long awaited bilateral Agreement on Air Quality ("Agree-
ment" or "Air Quality Agreement").2 10
A. Reaffirmation of Principles of State External Responsibility
In the Agreement, the parties reiterated their adherence to the interna-
tional principle of external responsibility in the environmental con-
text.2 11 The parties also reaffirmed their commitment to Principle 21 of
the Stockholm Declaration.21 2 By doing so, the United States and Can-
ada strengthened their commitment to the international principle of
external responsibility, thereby relinquishing certain rights under the
international principle of state sovereignty. 213
B. Beyond the Current Acid Rain Problem
The Agreement goes beyond addressing the current acid rain problem.
The stated objective is to control all types of transboundary air pollution
between the two countries, with the exception of those having global
effects, such as ozone depletion.214 The Agreement defines air pollu-
tion and transboundary air pollution in essentially the same way these
terms were defined in the 1979 ECE Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution;215 the only real difference is that the Agreement
excludes pollutants having global effects. 216 Under the Agreement, the
210. Agreement on Air Quality, Mar. 13, 1991, U.S.-Can., 30 I.L.M. 676 (1991)
[hereinafter Air Quality Agreement].
211. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. In this Principle, the parties
acknowledged many of their past efforts to resolve transboundary pollution
problems. These included the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, supra note 44; the
Trail Smelter Arbitration of 1941, supra note 44; the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1978, as amended, supra note 44; the Memorandum of Intent of 1980,
supra note 176; the 1986 JOINT REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ENVOYS ON ACID RAIN, supra
note 194; the ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of
1979, supra note 3; and the Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, at 1.
213. See supra note 90.
214. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. 1(2).
215. ECE Convention, supra note 3.
216. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, Introduction and art. I. The Agree-
ment defines "air pollution" as "the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of
substances into the air resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger
human health, harm living resources and ecosystems and material property and
impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment." Id.
art. I.
The Air Quality Agreement defines "transboundary air pollution" as "air pollution
whose physical origin is situated wholly or in part within the area under the jurisdic-
tion of one Party and which has adverse effects, other than effects of a global nature,
in the area under the jurisdiction of the other Party." Id.
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United States and Canada agreed to "establish specific objectives... for
emissions limitations of such air pollutants as the Parties agree to
address." 2 17 To date, the Agreement contains provisions regarding
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions, as well as on the preven-
tion of significant deterioration and visibility protection.218 Neverthe-
less, by keeping the scope of the Agreement broad, the parties have
established a framework to resolve other troublesome areas of trans-
boundary air pollution such as urban smog.2 19
C. Specific Objectives for the Emissions Limitations of Sulphur
Dioxide and Nitrogen Oxides
Annex 1 of the Agreement contains each country's specific objectives for
emissions limitations of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. 220 The
United States has committed itself to the sulphur dioxide and nitrogen
oxide emission control programs established under the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments discussed above.221
Canada has agreed to continue its commitment to reduce its
sulphur dioxide emission levels in the seven eastern-most provinces to
2.3 million metric tons per year by 1994.222 In addition, Canada com-
mitted itself to the achievement of a permanent national cap on sulphur
dioxide emissions of 3.2 million metric tons per year by 2000.223 As for
nitrogen oxide emissions, Canada agreed to develop more stringent
controls on nitrogen oxide emissions on stationary sources. 224 Canada
also agreed to impose emissions limitations on mobile sources which
closely correlate to those under the 1990 Amendments to the United
States Clean Air Act.2 25 The United States and Canada have also made
commitments to add more stringent sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide
emission limitations than are required by the ECE Convention, its Pro-
tocols, and any other agreement to which they are parties.226
D. Assessment, Notification, and Mitigation
The assessment, notification, and mitigation provisions of the Air Qual-
ity Agreement are more comprehensive than similar provisions of the
Memorandum of Intent and the ECE Convention. 227 These provisions
217. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. IV(1).
218. Id. annex 1.
219. Work is already under way in Canada on an urban smog annex to the Agree-
ment. Air Quality Accord Between U.S., Canada Sets Framework to Resolve Future Issues, 14
INT'L ENvTL. REP. (BNA) 127 (1991).
220. Id. annex 1.
221. See supra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
222. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, annex 1. One metric tonne is equal to
1.1 tons.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.; 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, supra note 128.
226. See, e.g., ECE Convention, supra note 3.
227. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. V; ECE Convention, supra note 3,
art 5. These provisions are also more comprehensive than those found in the Bound-
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may help to provide each country with better guidance in their actions
and decisions than did previous international agreements.
The ECE Convention merely provides that both the United States
and Canada shall engage in consultations, upon request, if one of the
parties is actually exposed to a "significant risk of long-range trans-
boundary air pollution. '2 28 The Air Quality Agreement goes further by
explicitly requiring each party to initially assess any proposed activities
and projects within its jurisdiction which, if carried out, "would be likely
to cause significant transboundary air pollution."2 29
The Agreement requires that each party notify the other in advance
of any decisions concerning them. 230 The Agreement also mandates
consultation, at the request of either party, concerning such propos-
als2 3 1 as well as any changes in either country's laws, regulations, or
policies that "would be likely to affect significantly transboundary air
pollution. 2 32
These consultations must commence "as soon as practicable, but in
any event not later than thirty days from the date of receipt of the
request for consultation, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties,"' 233 and
must include consideration of appropriate mitigation measures. 2 34 If,
after consultatiori, an issue remains unresolved, the Agreement man-
dates that the parties refer the matter to an "appropriate third party" in
accordance with agreed terms of reference. 2 35
One weakness of these provisions is that there is a lingering ambi-
guity as to what constitutes "significant transboundary air pollution."
This ambiguity leaves each nation with broad discretion in making the
determination as to whether a particular proposed or continuing action
should be subject to the assessment, notification, and mitigation
requirements. This problem may not, however, be as critical in the con-
text of this bilateral agreement as it has been with previous multilateral
ary Waters Treaty, supra note 44, and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement,
supra note 44.
228. ECE Convention, supra note 3, art. 5.
229. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. V(l).
230. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. V. Art. V(1) requires that "[e]ach
party shall ... assess those proposed actions, activities and projects within [its juris-
diction] that if carried out would be likely to cause significant transboundary air pol-
lution, including consideration of appropriate mitigation measures." Id.
231. Id art. X. The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty required prior approval by the
IJC for uses, obstructions or diversions of boundary waters which affected the flow or
level of the other nation's water. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 44, arts. III, IV
and VII. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. V(3). The ECE Convention
similarly requires consultations, upon request.
232. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. V(2), (3).
233. Id. art. XI.
234. Id. art. V(4). Appropriate mitigation measures are required to be taken for
any covered actions, activities or projects. Id. art. V(5).
235. Id. art. XII. It can be assumed that this referral provision is a reflection of the
type of action taken in the Trail Smelter Case, discussed supra notes 74-89 and
accompanying text, where the Parties picked a three member arbitration tribunal to
settle its dispute.
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agreements because such determinations are more easily monitored
where only two countries are involved, especially where the relationship
is as close as that between the United States and Canada. This problem
is also mitigated to a degree by the exchange of information provisions
and the general framework set up by the Agreement in which the parties
can negotiate and agree on more particular standards.
E. Coordinated Activities in the Context of Scientific and Technical
Activities and Economic Research
The mandates of the Air Quality Agreement concerning scientific and
technical activities, as well as economic research, also go farther than
similar provisions found in the Memorandum of Intent and the ECE
Convention. In the Agreement, the United States and Canada agreed to
coordinate their monitoring activities through the "coordination of
existing networks... additions of monitoring tasks of existing networks
.. addition of stations or networks where no existing monitoring facil-
ity can perform [the] necessary function ... the use of compatible data
management procedures, formats and methods ... [and] the exchange
of monitoring information." 23 6  Furthermore, it provides for the
exchange of information or various monitoring, research, development,
and analytical activities. 23 7
Such coordinated activities will lead to a better understanding of
transboundary air pollution problems faster than individual efforts. The
knowledge generated will alleviate many of the issues related to causa-
tion. For example, these efforts may lead to better tracking technologies
and models that would allow a court to assess the liability of particular
polluters. More agreement over the effects of a particular state's pollu-
tion activities may prompt the EPA Administrator to utilize section 115
of the Clean Air Act to change a state's pollution program in response to
the transboundary damage in Canada.
As with most affirmative programs, these coordination provisions
will involve costs for each party. It is arguable, however, that the total
costs will be lower than one might expect. Costs may be saved because
one nation's efforts will not be duplicated in the other nation. A better
understanding of transboundary air pollution will enable both nations to
better attune their environmental policies to the actual effects of trans-
boundary air pollution. Most importantly, these efforts and the knowl-
edge acquired through them will aid in developing cheaper, more
efficient ways to curb pollution. If both countries exercise good faith in
236. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 2 10, annex 2. The Memorandum of Intent
speaks very little to monitoring activities. Memorandum of Intent, supra note 176.
The ECE Convention speaks of the "desirability" and the "need" for such coordi-
nated activities as those agreed upon in the Air Quality Agreement. ECE Conven-
tion, supra note 3.
237. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, annex 2. The ECE Convention was
comparably thorough with respect to the cooperation of the parties in the context of
research, development and economic assessments. ECE Convention, supra note 3,
art. 7.
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their dealings, these coordinated activities could prove very effective in
addressing transboundary air pollution problems.
F. Review and Assessment Program
One of the most significant aspects of the Air Quality Agreement is the
establishment of an advanced program to review and assess the progress
made in the implementation of the Agreement. This program includes
the involvement of a bilateral Air Quality Committee, set up under the
Agreement, 23 8 the International Joint Commission, both the United
States and Canada, and the public. 23 9 It also establishes a schedule for
reviewing progress made in the implementation of the Agreement,
including time limits for consultations between the parties. 240
Such a comprehensive review program was absent from previous
international agreements addressing transboundary air pollution. The
ECE Convention merely directed the established Executive Body to
"review the implementation of the present Convention," and to "estab-
lish as appropriate, working groups to consider matters related to the
implementation and development of the present Convention .. .,,241
The subsequent protocols to the ECE Convention provided merely that:
"The parties shall regularly review the present Protocol, taking into
account the best available scientific substantiation and technological
development," and added that the first review take place within the first
year after the date of entry into force.24 2
Under the Air Quality Agreement, the United States and Canada
agreed to establish a bilateral Air Quality Committee, composed of an
equal number of members representing each Party. 243 The Committee
has the responsibility for preparing progress reports every two years. 24 4
The Agreement directs that these reports be submitted to both coun-
tries and the International Joint Commission, and then released to the
public.
The Agreement gave the International Joint Commission the
responsibility of inviting comments on the reports, "including through
public hearings," and of compiling a record and preparing a synthesis of
238. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. VIII.
239. No other agreements concerning transboundary pollution of any form, to
which the United States and Canada are parties, requires public participation in
reviewing and assessing progress made in the implementation of the agreement. See,
e.g., Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 44; Water Quality Agreement, supra note 44
(authorizes the IJC to conduct public hearings at its discretion); ECE Convention,
supra note 3.
240. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, arts. X and XI.
241. ECE Convention, supra note 3, art. 10.
242. See, e.g., 1988 Protocol, supra note 123, art. 5. This task was indeed accom-
plished. PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 16.
243. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. VIII. A similar committee, the
Water Quality Committee, was established under Article VIII of the Water Quality
Agreement, supra note 44, art. VIII.
244. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. VIII(a), (b).
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the comments presented on each report.245 The Agreement requires
that the record and synthesis then be submitted to the parties and
released to the public.2 46 This may pose some time costs, but such costs
are outweighed by the benefits of public participation and oversight in
the implementation of the Agreement.
One of the most significant improvements in this context over past
agreements is the mandatory consultation requirement on the contents
of these reports. The Agreement mandates that these consultations take
place "as soon as practicable, but in any event not later than thirty days
from the date of receipt of the request for consultations, unless other-
wise agreed by the Parties." '24 7 Consultations are mandatory, and not
triggered only when a party requests them. 248 Another advantage is the
requirement that the United States and Canada conduct a "comprehen-
sive review and assessment" of the Agreement every five years. 24 9
The elaborate review and assessment process established in the Air
Quality Agreement ensures a forum for all viewpoints. This forum
should create better solutions to the controversial issues involved in
transboundary air pollution disputes. In fact, the Agreement also
requires the parties to consult with "State or Provincial Governments,
interested organizations, and the public," when appropriate, in imple-
menting the agreement.25 0
By providing schedules and time limits, the Agreement ensures that
action, at least in the form of bilateral consultations, will be taken within
reasonable time limits. As such, the agreement provides a means by
which each party, as well as each party's state or provincial governments,
citizens, and interest groups, can exert substantial pressure on the other
party to implement and effectuate the objectives of the agreement.
G. Consultations, Referrals, and Settlement of Disputes
The referral and dispute resolution provisions of the Agreement are
also more elaborate and promise to be more effective in resolving dis-
putes than have past agreements between Canada and the United States
regarding transboundary pollution. 25 '
If the parties are unable to resolve certain issues or disputes, the
Agreement provides two means of settlement. For issues that remain
unresolved after consultation, the Agreement provides that the parties
shall "refer the matter to an appropriate third party .... -252
245. Id. art. IX(l).
246. Id. art. IX(l).
247. Id. art. XI.
248. Id. art. X.
249. Id. art. X.
250. Id. art. XIV.
251. Id. arts. XI, XII and XIII.
252. Id. art. XII. The Agreement does not elaborate on who may be an "appropri-
ate third party." Id.
449
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For disputes arising over the "interpretation or the implementa-
tion" of the agreement, a separate process applies. For these disputes,
the Agreement directs the parties, "after consultations," to commence
negotiations to resolve the disputes, "as soon as practicable, but in any
event not later than ninety days ... unless otherwise agreed by the Par-
ties."'2 53 If the parties fail to resolve the dispute by negotiations, they
must consider whether to submit the dispute to the International Joint
Commission or to "another agreed form of dispute resolution. '254
The Agreement also provides that the parties may refer to the Inter-
nationalJoint Commission ("IJC") any other matters "as may be appro-
priate for the effective implementation of this Agreement. '25 5 The
Agreement does not extend any new powers to the IJC.2 56 Neverthe-
less, it does confirm that the IJC's jurisdiction extends to air pollution
not having a significant effect on the Great Lakes or other boundary
waters. 2
5 7
By comparison, the ECE Convention and its Protocols merely pro-
vide that "[i]f a dispute arises ... as to the interpretation or application
of the Convention, [the parties] shall seek a solution by negotiation or
by any other method of dispute settlement acceptable to the parties to
the dispute."' 258 The ECE Convention gives little guidance to the par-
ties on how to approach unresolved issues and disputes. The ECE Con-
vention imposes no requirements for consultation prior to negotiations
concerning such disputes. Furthermore, it places no time limits on
when any consultations or negotiations must be commenced.
One arguably major weakness of the Agreement in the context of
dispute resolution is that it does not appear to establish any clear
enforcement procedures that would give the parties a remedy for
breach, other than negotiation or withdrawal. The Agreement merely
provides that if the parties do not resolve issues through negotiation,
they shall consider whether to submit that dispute to the IJC. If they
decide not to take that route, "they shall, at the request of either Party,
253. Id. art. XIII(I).
254. Id. art. VIII(2). The Trail Smelter Case, discussed supra notes 74-86 and
accompanying text, is one example of an alternative form of dispute resolution,
where the United States and Canada agreed to have the transboundary air pollution
issues decided by a three member arbitration tribunal. See Cagann, supra note 89, at
180.
255. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. IX. Similar provisions can be
found in the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 44, art. IX and the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 44, art. VII.
256. Prior to the Air Quality Agreement, virtually any matter arising between the
two countries could be the subject of a "reference" to the IJC. FRIENDLY NEICHBORS,
supra note 1, at 193.
257. The Water Quality Agreement gave the IJC jurisdiction over air pollution
problems that have "significant adverse effects on environmental quality." Water
Quality Agreement, supra note 44, art. VI(1)(1). This provision may be interpreted to
extend the IJC's jurisdiction only over air pollution problems affecting the Great
Lakes. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
258. ECE Convention, supra note 3, art. 13.
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submit the dispute to another agreed form of dispute resolution." 25 9
The Agreement does not impose on the parties an obligation to submit
these disputes to any binding court or tribunal.260 Commentators have
criticized past agreements between the United States and Canada for
limiting the IJC's powers only to those matters brought to it through the
reference process. 26 1 The Agreement would no doubt be a more effec-
tive agreement had the IJC or some other bilateral organization been
given initiating and binding powers, but it is questionable whether such
a provision would have been, or will be in the near future, politically
acceptable. 26 2
This weakness is mitigated, however, by the mandatory negotiation
provisions. By imposing consultation and negotiation requirements,
and by placing specific time limits on when these undertakings must be
commenced, the Air Quality Agreement assures that bilateral efforts to
resolve disputes will commence within a reasonable time period. Fur-
thermore, some have characterized the reference process as an effective
means for settling disputes and addressing transboundary pollution
problems. 263 Admittedly, however, these provisions may not be ade-
quate to resolve many of the problems that may arise in the area of
transboundary air pollution.
V. Progress and Implementation Overview
The Canada-United States Air Quality Committee, established under
the Agreement, met for the first time on November 26, 1991, in Wash-
ington, D.C. 26 4 In order to assist in carrying out the terms of the Agree-
ment, the committee set up two subcommittees.2 6 5 One subcommittee
is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Agreement and
works on such issues as emission inventories, control technologies, and
market-based mechanisms. 26 6 The other subcommittee's focus is on sci-
259. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 210, art. XIII(2).
260. Many treaties employ binding third party dispute resolution mechanisms. For
example, the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement provides for a binding
arbitration tribunal. Moller, supra note 73, at 1239. The nations, however, explicitly
decided not to extend the tribunal's jurisdiction over acid rain issues. Id.
261. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text; FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note
1, at 197.
262. See Moller, supra note 73, at 1234-35 (proposing that the IJC could be an
effective administrator of an air quality agreement between Canada and the United
States, but points to the view of commentators who argue that "to extend the powers
of the IJC to include air pollution would dangerously weaken its ability to operate
effectively"). Assuming that an independent body would achieve higher enforcement
levels than domestic agencies, an increase in litigation and cleanup costs can be
expected. One could expect, therefore, these industrial polluters to engage in a tre-
mendous lobbying effort against giving an independent body such enforcement
powers.
263. See FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, supra note 1, at 197.
264. PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 16, at 9.
265. Id. at 1.
266. Id.
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entific and technical activities.267
Canadian sulphur dioxide emissions in Eastern Canada are already
within about sixteen percent of the Agreement's 1994 target of 2.3 mil-
lion metric tonnes.26 8 Sulphur dioxide emissions nationally in Canada
have come within about 20 percent of the Agreement's target of 3.2 mil-
lion metric tonnes. 269 As for nitrogen oxide emissions in Canada, a
reduction program is being formalized through the use of federal-pro-
vincial agreements. 270
The United States has been slower in implementing the acid rain
provisions of the Clean Air Act and the requirements of Annex 1 of the
Air Quality Agreement. To its credit, in December, 1991, the United
States EPA finalized its first rules governing the auction and sale of
allowances under the acid rain program. 27' However, it was not until
January 11, 1993 that the EPA promulgated its final rule regarding four
other areas of critical importance to the acid rain program: acid rain
permits, sulphur dioxide allowances, continuous emissions monitoring
and excess emissions penalties. 272 As for reductions in nitrogen oxide
emissions, regulations implementing the mobile source provisions of
the Clean Air Act and the Air Quality Agreement were promulgated in
June 1991.273 Rules to implement the nitrogen oxide emission require-
ments of the acid rain control program of the Clean Air Act are being
developed. 274
Apart from the development and initiation of each party's domestic
programs to meet the Agreement's terms, the primary bilateral activities
have occured in the scientific and technical areas, including a sharing of
ideas and research regarding emission inventories, atmospheric model-
ing, deposition monitoring, control technologies and market-based
incentives to help reduce the cost of emission reductions. 275 Most
importantly at this stage, the parties have taken advantage of the Agree-
ment's framework by freely exchanging people and information. Since
the inception of the Agreement, "the number of contacts and degree of
267. Id.
268. Id. at 17.
269. Id. Sulphur dioxide emissions nationally in Canada had declined from 4.6
million metric tonnes in 1980 to 3.5 million metric tonnes in 1990. Id. Canada is
currently developing a program to maintain a national cap of 3.2 million metric ton-
nes per year by the end of 1999. Id.
270. Id. at 21.
271. Id. at 19.
272. 58 Fed. Reg. 3590-01, Jan. 11, 1993 (EPA) (see text under "Acid Rain
Rulemaking Overview").
273. PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 16, at 22.
274. Id.; see 57 Fed. Reg. 55632-01, Nov. 25, 1992 (EPA Proposed Rule). Repre-
sentative Henry A. Waxman, a Californian Democrat, and the Sierra Club filed a law-
suit against the EPA for missing statutory deadlines for issuing regulations
implementing the Clean Air Act. EPA Settles Clean Air Rule Lawsuit, UTILITY ENVIRON-
MENT REPORT 16 (Dec. 11, 1992). Under the resulting settlement agreement, the
EPA agreed to issue final rules on nitrogen oxide controls in the acid rain program by
October 30, 1993. Id.
275. Id.
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cooperation and exchange of information has increased significantly, to
the benefit of both countries. 2 76
Generally, "progress has been made by each country, individually
and together. A forum for discussion has been established; programs to
resolve domestic and transboundary air quality issues are being devel-
oped, and information about them is being shared; lessons learned from
existing and past programs also are being shared; and the pursuit of
data compatibility between countries is under way." 2 77 There is no rea-
son to believe that progress will ease under the administration of the
newly elected United States President, Bill Clinton. In fact, one may
forecast that, under the guidance of Vice President Al Gore, a well-
known advocate for environmental causes, and the newly appointed
Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Carol Browner, the new administration will pursue the goals and terms
of the Agreement with renewed vigor. 278
Conclusion
The Air Quality Agreement is a vast improvement over past attempts to
address transboundary air pollution problems. The Agreement
strengthens the international principle of external responsibility in the
environmental context and establishes an effective bilateral framework
for addressing the problem of transboundary air pollution.
The assessment, notification, and mitigation provisions, coupled
with consultation requirements, provide each country with the means to
effectively influence domestic activities of the other country. Provisions
requiring coordinated activities in the context of scientific and technical
activities, and economic research, promise to accelerate our knowledge
of transboundary air pollution problems and the development of meth-
ods for handling them.
The Agreement's review and assessment provisions, coupled with
mandatory negotiation and consultation requirements, create a means
for ensuring that the Agreement is implemented effectively. The Agree-
ment exposes the review process to the public eye and places time limits
on the commencement of negotiations and consultations. These provi-
sions counteract the negative consequences, such as delay tactics and
bad faith activities, that could result from the Agreement's lack of.
independent enforcement mechanisms.
276. Id.
277. PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
278. Carol Browner previously worked with Al Gore, helped draft the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments, and has already indicated that meeting Clean Air Act rule-
making deadlines will be a priority. Storm-tested Browner 'Plenty Tough'for Job, USA
TODAYJan. 8, 1993, at 9A. As stated by Sierra Club ChairmanJ. Michael McCloskey,
"Carol Browner's appointment is a breath of fresh air after twelve years of choking
smog." Sierra Club Applauds Choice of Browner to Head EPA, BusINESS WIRE, Dec. 11,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
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Overall, the Agreement is a vast improvement over past bilateral
and multilateral efforts to confront transboundary air pollution issues.
The Agreement did not set out to resolve the issues in one stroke of a
pen. Rather, as is indicated by the progress made since the Agreement's
inception, it has sought to establish an effective framework in which to
bilaterally address present and future transboundary air pollution
problems between the United States and Canada.
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